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ROMAN LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
WESTERN CINiLIZATION'
HESSEL E. YNTEmA*
There have been, in the Western world, two dominant legal systems,
the Roman and the English. Both are functions of empire, the products
of peoples gifted to rule. Undoubtedly, the historic influence of Roman
law has been dependent in the last analysis upon the predominant posi-
tion occupied by Rome in the ancient world and the enormous prestige
that the Eternal City for centuries thereafter enjoyed. Likewise with
the law of England; its reception in North America and in other parts
of the world attended the expansion of British colonization and influence
in modern times. It is not surprising, therefore, that, despite certain
differences, for example in technical skill and sea-faring instinct which
have characterized the inhabitants of Great Britain, they should possess
basic traits analogous to those exhibited by the Roman citizenry, who,
after establishing the hegemony of Rome in the Italian peninsula, within
the brief space of less than two centuries brought the entire Mediter-
ranean world under its control. The qualities which Mommsen attributes
to the Roman also typify the British character: reverence for authority
and tradition, hostility to exotic individualism, insistence on useful occu-
pation, on Victorian modesty, on frugality, and above all loyalty, again
and again demonstrated in steadfast resistance to the public enemy,
in unshaken fidelity to their native land and its institutions, and in per-
severing courage under the severest trials.2 In their days of glory, the
government of both peoples exhibited beneath democratic forms the
assurance of a tireless aristocracy, conscious of its mission, jealous of
its liberties, contemptuously liberal to subject races, as shrewd in mer-
cantile trading as it was gifted in the arts of command. In philosophy
and science, however, the Romans were but moderately gifted; as Ortega
has remarked of the English too, they were provided with intellectual
capacities sufficient, but not too much, for their role in history.3
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1 In substance, this paper reproduces a lecture given August 2, 1949, at Ann Arbor, in
the series on the "Civilizations of Ancient Greece and Rome."
2 For Mommsen's analysis of the pristine Roman, as contrasted with the Hellenic,
character, see Rdiscu. GEscn-cHT_, Vol. I, Book I, Chapter 2 (Translation by W. P.
Dickson, The History of Rome, Vol. 1, pp. 23 et seq. in the Everyman edition).
3 In El Tema de Nuestro Tiempo (Espasa-Calpe Edition, 1947, Buenos Aires, p. 146),
Ortega y Gasset remarks:
"No se puede decir que el pueblo inglis sea muy inteligente. Y no es que le falte
inteligencia; es que no sobra. Posee la justa, la que estrictamente hace falta para vivir.
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In the legal systems of these two peoples, accordingly appear signif-
icant analogies. In each case, a sharp division was soon made between
sacred and secular justice; in each the power of the state was developed
at a relatively early stage, the administration of justice was profession-
alized, and a system of private law, articulated in specific forms of
action, superseded the blood-feud and other institutions of the prior
communal custom. In each system, the scheme of rights thus elaborated
became rigidly formalized and had to be supplemented, corrected, and
eventually superseded by a parallel system of equitable remedies, intro-
duced by the authority of a magistrate-the praetor in Rome, the
chancellor in London. This palliative in time became stereotyped, and
legislation, which in England as in Rome at the outset was sporadically
employed on critical occasions to impose constitutional limits on execu-
tive power to remove social abuses, ultimately became the chief method
of legal development. Most noteworthy is the fact that both are essen-
tially systems of case-law, evolved by specialists, generally indifferent
to history and with little theory and less philosophy. Even today the
law of England and the United States is dominantly casuistic; that the
same was true of the law of Rome, even as late as Justinian, will appear
on casual inspection of the Corpus Juris, the principal source of our
knowledge of the Roman legal literature. The theoretical refinement of
the modern civil law, however deeply indebted for its inspiration to the
Roman sources, is largely post-Roman, and its symmetrical organiza-
tion in the Code Napol6on and succeeding modern codifications is the
product of scholastic attainments or at least interest in synthetic analysis,
that neither the Roman jurists nor the English judges customarily
displayed.
Doubtless, to this practical interest in the solution of specific problems
is due also the even less systematic evolution of public law in both the
Roman and the English schemes of government. The constitution of
Rome, at least until the late Empire, concerning which we are not too
well informed, like that of England, was a flexible tradition, embodying
time-honored usages, conventions shifting with the incidence of political
power, and statutory accretions of revolutionary reform or compromise.
This was its chief virtue, it seemed to the austere Cato as reported by
Cicero, namely, that it was the product, not of one genius but of many,
established not during the lifetime of one man but by various men in
P r esto mismo, su era revolucionaria ha sido la msL moderada y tefilda siempre de un
matiz conservador.
"Lo propio aconteci6 en Roma. Otro pueblo de hombres sanos y fuertes, con gran
apetito de vivir y de mandar pero poco inteligentes. Su despertar intelectual es tardio y se
produce en contacto con la cultura griega."
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various generations. 4
Of the two systems of justice, the Roman has undoubtedly wider
historic significance. This, it may be believed, is more to be attributed
to circumstance than to intrinsic superiority, as was once thought. In
the first place, the history of the law of Rome stretches back from
Justinian for thirteen centuries, and by its reception in the medieval
and modern civil law has survived for more than thirteen additional
centuries as a fluctuating body of doctrine, constantly reproduced and
re-adapted to new periods and peoples, much of which has evolved from
the classical era of Roman law into the modern codes, being in the
process refined, reformed, discarded, or revived as needs have required
until the residue has become an international ius gentium. In the second
place, the fact that the Roman jurists were the first to study the prob-
lems of justice in detail as presented in the rich experience of a cosmo-
politan empire gave their work an originality and freshness, a freedom
from theoretical preconceptions, necessarily denied to subsequent genera-
tions of jurists. The third and indeed vital source of the decisive
influence of Roman law in Western culture is the fact that it was, once
for all, embodied by the Emperor Justinian in the Corpus Juris, the
authoritative form in which, like the Bible in things spiritual and the
works of Aristotle for philosophy, it was received as the epitome of
justice in later times. These factors, the length of its experience, its
cosmopolitan viewpoint, and the effective form in which it was codified,
explain the unique position of Roman law in history. In the opinion of
Buckland, one of the greatest Romanists of our time, next to Christianity,
it "was the greatest factor in the creation of modern civilization, and
it is the greatest intellectual legacy of Rome." 5
II
The sources of our knowledge of Roman law in the ancient world
include, in addition to the codification of Justinian, the literature of
the ancient world that has survived, the inscriptions and other remains
from Roman times, including particularly the papyri discovered in the
Eastern provinces, and various more specifically legal writings, of which
easily the most important for our knowledge of the evolution of law
in the Roman world are the Institutes of Gaius, apparently an un-
finished manuscript of lectures, dating from the second century A.D., or
shortly after the death of the Emperor Pius, by a law teacher, of whose
4 DE RE PUB., II, 1, where Cicero states that "nostra autem res publica non unius esset
ingenio, sed multorum, nec una hominis vita, sed aliquot constituta saeculis et aetatibus."
5 (Page 5, end of 1st paragraph, line 14): (1931) J. Soc. PuB. TEAcH. LAW 25.
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career we are otherwise ignorant. This is the only classical treatise
on Roman law which has come down to us substantially intact. In all
respects, however, the most important source of information is the
Corpus Juris Civilis itself.
Justinian became co-regent with his uncle, Justinius, in 527 and on
the latter's death later in the year, sole emperor. In his plans to revive
the ancient grandeur of the Roman empire, the project of reforming
and restating the law must have had an important place, for the enter-
prise was initiated almost immediately upon his accession to the throne,
and the codification was completed in 534. It included the Institutes,
the Digest, the Code, and the Novels, or constitutions, enacted after 534.
Except for the Novels, this great work, reproduced in some 2300 closely
printed quarto pages in the stereotyped edition, was accomplished by
the joint efforts of four law professors and a handful of practitioners,
under the direction of Tribonian, a learned and leading member of
the Digest, the Code, and the Novels, or constitutions enacted after 534.
a commission to prepare a new collection of the imperial constitutions
or enactments; this was completed in a year, and the collection published
April 7, 529. This was followed by a series of fifty decisions in which
Justinian undertook to reform aspects of the existing law and possibly
to control its citation, presumably in 530 or 531, before the plan for
the Digest had been settled and its difficulties had been grasped. Neither
these decisions nor the Code of 529 have been preserved, since in the
preparation of the Digest it became clear that a revised Code would
be necessary. This was completed in 534 and published on November 16
of that year as the Codex repetitae praelectionis. In effect, this was
a reproduction of earlier collections, the Codices Gregorianus and
Hermogenianus and the Codex Theodosianus of 438, with the addition
of later constitutions, including only those that remained in force, dras-
tically edited, abridged, and interpolated.
Important as the Code is for the law from the time of the Emperor
Hadrian, the central and most significant part of Justinian's codification
is the Digest, in which the earlier legal literature was excerpted in fifty
books, divided into titles according to subject matter. Justinian states
in the C. Tanta of December 16, 533, by which the Digest was given
the force of law that nearly 2000 libri (actually about 1625) by thirty-
nine authors, containing 3,000,000 lines, were read and reduced to
150,000.6 This compilation was authorized by a constitution of Decem-
6 The Constitutio Tanta may conveniently be found in the Mommsen-Krueger stereo-
typed twelfth edition of the Digest, Berlin, 1911, at pp. 13 et seq. The statement is in the
first paragraph at p. 14.
[Vol. 3 5
ROMAN LAW
ber 15, 530, addressed to Tribonian and empowering him to select a
commission to assist him, with full authority to revise and cut down
the texts of the writings of the ancient jurists who had authority to
interpret the laws and with instructions to choose what the commis-
sioners thought best, eliminating all that was superfluous, obsolete,
contradictory, repetitious, or already contained in the Code (except as
clarity required). All abbreviations were prohibited, so that the inscrip-
tiones, giving the author, title, and book of the work for each fragment,
have been well preserved and have been of the greatest value in recon-
stituting the original writings.
The method followed was discovered by Bluhme in a brilliant study,
published in 1820 and except for corrections in detail generally accepted.7
After establishing the, general scheme, following that of the Code and
the commentaries on the Edict, the materials were divided into four
groups, the Sabinus, covering the ius civile, the basic civil law; the
Edict, including the commentaries on the law introduced on equitable
principles by the praetor; the Papinian, including works of a practical
or specialist nature, so named since the excerpts from this group begin
with the Quaestiones and the Responsa of Papinian, the most celebrated
of the Roman jurists, and finally the Appendix, believed to include
works discovered in the process of compilation. After the materials in
each group had been read by individual members or assistants of the
commission, the resulting excerpts were assembled under the various
titles and books and then so combined as to form a coherent text, in
which the largest group of excerpts was normally placed first. The com-
pilation of the juristic materials in the Digest was supplemented by the
Institutes, a textbook for students which was in effect a revised official
edition of the Institutes of Gaius, including excerpts from other sources.
There is sufficient evidence by comparison of texts incorporated in
the Corpus Juris with versions preserved in other sources that This
process involved substantial editing of the originals. For this reason,
one of the most important types of inquiry in the efforts of modern
scholarship to trace the historical evolution of the doctrines of Roman
law has been the study of interpolations, a study which involves not
merely ascertaining the emblemata Triboniani, viz., the changes made
by Justinian's commission, but also, as has been recently accepted, the
delicate task of determining what alterations may have been made in
the classical texts before Justinian's time in the process of harmonizing
the ius civile with the ius honorarium.
7 F. Bluhme, Die Ordnung der Fragmente in den Pandectentiteln, 4 ZEiTscHR= PfjIR
GEscCcTcnE REcnTSWISSENSCHArr, 257 et seq (1820). Cf. F. Schulz, HISTORY Op
RomAN LEGAL SINCE, 319-322 (1946).
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III
It is appropriate at this juncture to pause for a summary reference
to the story incompletely revealed by these problematical sources. They
do not go back to the beginnings; the Roman people enter upon the
scene of history relatively advanced in culture and with remarkably
few vestiges of more primitive antecedents. For practical purposes, the
known history of Roman law commences with the Twelve Tables, cus-
tomarily dated at 451 B.C., when the Roman state was already firmly
constituted as a republic. Even though the tradition of a prior period
of monarchy be admitted, the reconstruction of its legal institutions is
possible only by inference from later times. Indeed, although the Twelve
Tables were venerated as the basic constitution of the Republic and
were memorized by schoolboys in Cicero's time, the occasion for their
enactment is disputed, and the existing knowledge of their contents is
fragmentary. Even so, the remains enable us to discern the lineaments
of what has been termed the archaic epoch of Roman law. This con-
tinued until the second Punic war; in the last two centuries of the
Republic, which may be described as the creative period, contempo-
raneous with the spread of Hellenistic influences, occurred those remark-
able developments in both the administration and substance of the law,
which were consolidated during the succeeding and more conservative
classical era of the Principate. The epilogue was the bureaucratic period
from Diocletian to Justinian. Our concern here is not to depict in detail
the law of Rome as it evolved through these stages, but rather to
endeavor to identify elements which for the present purpose seem of
more than circumstantial significance in this long evolution.
In the first place, we must be impressed by the definite organization
of the Roman state from the outset and the recognition of its supreme
authority. Basically, it included three elements, the Roman citizens,
the magistrates whom they elected in the comitia or popular assemblies,
and the senate appointed by the consuls, the chief magistrates, to advise
them in their office. This arrangement involved certain to us striking
features. Thus, although the basic laws were enacted by the comitia,
the voting was always by groups, not individuals, and the assembly
could meet only when summoned by the appropriate magistrate and
could only vote, without discussion, upon the business laid before it by
the magistrate who summoned it. Subject to the legislation-the leges-
thus laid down by the burgesses, the Romans vested in their principal
magistrates a general imperium, which included the power to seize and
condemn individual citizens, to command the military, to administer
justice, and to convene the assembly. The limitations upon this essen-
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tially absolute conception of authority were practical rather than con-
stitutional in the modern sense. For example, the chief office was divided
between two consuls, elected for a year; the brevity of the term and
the power to veto the acts of each other long interposed a practical
obstacle to the establishment of a monarchy. In addition, the creation
of other offices, such as the tribunate, and in particular the political
necessity of consulting the senate provided additional limitations and
control. Moreover, in capital cases the condemned citizen had the right
of provocatio to the assembly, and from the beginning the sphere of
religion was separate from the secular government.
Thus, from the founding of the Republic at least, the Romans had
separated the secular jurisdiction from the spiritual, as they had also
laid the basis for the fundamental distinction in their system between
public and private rights. These for their time were extraordinary
achievements, the former of which is presumably related to the social,
political, and economic struggle between the patricians and the plebeians
and the creditor and debtor classes. This struggle, which occasioned
important reforms in the law, including probably the enactment of the
Twelve Tables, and the establishment of the praetorship, did not termi-
nate except when the Principate of Divus Augustus arose from the
ashes of protracted revolution.
In this polity, the nascent body of law which was eventually epitomized
in the Corpus Iuris Civilis was limited in scope. Not only were the
sacral law and the law governing the Roman state as such excluded,
but a sharp line was early drawn between customary morals and law.
The Roman demand for liberty required wide areas free from legal rules
because of the number and effectiveness of nonlegal restrictions. This
may be illustrated by the character of the Roman family law, which
expressed in an extreme form the patriarchal principle. Theoretically,
the power of the pater-familias, like that of the magistrate, was general
and absolute; not only the slaves, the chattels, and the estate, but also
the wife and the children and their progeny, which had not by marriage
or emancipation passed into the power of another pater-familias, were
at his disposition. But this power, later alleviated somewhat by more
humane conceptions, was from the first restrained in practice by the
family council to which the head of the family was by custom required
to resort before making an important decision regarding a member of
the family.
In the development of the law by the classical jurists, this principle
of specialization was carried even further. They ignored the teleological
aspects of law, those elements of policy which are today regarded as of
1949] ROMAN LAW
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fundamental concern. They left to the advocates the facts of legal
disputes, which our law students are instructed to regard as the grounds
of decision. They left almost entirely out of account the social practices
regulated by law, the elaborate Roman marriage customs, the normal
contents of wills, the forms used in business transactions. And they
were equally disdainful of the legal institutions of other places than
Rome. They were as little concerned with comparative law as they
were indifferent to legal history. In short, the classical jurists sought
to ascertain, within the framework of the system of actions, the natural
rules regarding legal rights and duties. As a result of this economy in
the materials considered, the classical law assumes an almost logical
precision and definiteness. Roman legal science was the product of
specialization.
To explain how this was possible requires brief reference to the formal
sources of Roman law and to the Roman system of judicial procedure
as it developed in the classical period.
The books tell us that the methods by which legal rules might become
effective in Rome were: first, positive enactments, the leges voted by
the popular assemblies during the Republic, supplemented by senatus
consulta and imperial constitutions in various forms during the Empire;
second, edicts of the magistrates; and, third, interpretations, with which
are to be included the so-called responsa or opinions of the jurisconsults.
Custom is alsb mentioned but as of distinctly minor importance. Of
these, during the formative republican period, the comitial enactments
were few and brief. As Schulz has pointed out,8 until the energies of
the jurisconsults were definitely and anonymously absorbed into the
bureaucracy of the later Empire, the Romans apparently were averse
to formal legislation as a means of elaborating the law. The Twelve
Tables indeed were a codification of a sort, but limited to the terse enun-
ciation of the basic principles of justice that the exigencies of the plebs
in the early Republic could obtain. There was no further codification
until the fifth century after Christ, and this, the Codex Theodosianus,
was abortive. For the rest, the lex was occasionally employed to abolish
social evils, to enact specific rules such as the state alone could prescribe,
or to make administrative proyisions. The main fields of civil law,
contract, property, pledge, succession, family relations, were relatively
untouched.
On the other hand, the edicts of the magistrates, and especially of the
urban and peregrine praetors, the first inaugurated in 367 B.C. to ad-
8 Schulz, PR IcPLEs or RoANe LAW, Chapter II, Statutes and the Law, pp. 6-18
(1936).
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minister civil justice within the City and the second about 242 B.C. to
superintend the jurisdiction in cases involving foreigners, proved of the
greatest importance in the development of the law. As is commonly
known, it was by this means that the ius honorarium, the system of
remedies supplementing the earlier ius civile was created. The fact
that this could be accomplished by magistrates, elected for a year who
sought the office on political grounds, can be explained only by the
early development in Rome of specialists in private law by whom the
magistrates were advised and instructed.
For this reason, the interpretatia and the later responsa prudentum,
the applications of the law by the college of pontiffs at the outset and
by the jurisconsults after the pontifical monopoly of legal knowledge
was broken, formed the center of gravity in the technical development
of the law of Rome. This leads us to refer briefly to the Roman system
of private justice or, more specifically, to certain features of the system
that made the interpretation and application of the law by experts
essential.
In the Roman system of civil procedure, which like that of the Com-
mon Law was in classical times a contest of the parties, supervised by
the magistrate, rather than an officially directed inquisition, a distinction
was from the beginning drawn between the proceedings in iure, viz., the
pleadings leading to the formulations of the issue, and those apud iudicem,
the actual trial of the case. In the formalistic period of the early legis
actiones, or actions based upon the Twelve Tables, it was necessary for
the parties to recite their claims or defenses in literally exact terms, the
formulae for which were for a time at least the exclusive property of the
college of pontiffs. In the formulary procedure, by which the ancient
actions were superseded and which was employed throughout the classi-
cal period, the proceedings in iure involved the issuance of a formula by
the praetor, instructing the iudex to adjudge as the facts should appear
in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant on the conditions stated in the
formula and approved by the magistrate as representing the law.
On the other hand, the actual trial took place before a iudex, usually
agreed to by the parties, who was selected from a panel of leading
citizens-laymen.
This procedure, it need scarcely be pointed out, had the result of
placing the administration of justice in the hands of magistrates, typically
political figures, and the trials themselves under individuals who might
or might not be learned in the law. Both the magistrate and the iudex,
as well as the parties themselves, required the advice of experts who
by their studies had acquired authority in law. The consequence was
19491 ROMAN LAW
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not merely that in its detailed application the law was chiefly developed
by jurisconsults who had no recognized part in the procedure itself
but acted in an advisory capacity, but even more important, that their
attention was necessarily focused upon the very practical problems of
law presented in specific cases. The actual position of the jurisconsults
in the formulation and development of law was consequently comparable
to that of the judges in the English courts, with the advantages that
they did not have to justify their opinions immediately to disputatious
litigants and that, relieved of the tedium of presiding over the trials
themselves, they were able to concentrate their attention on the specific
problems of justice. In consequence, although Rome did not develop a
professional bar such as that of England and other European countries,
the interpretation and application of law was from the beginning special-
ized in the hands of a relatively limited group of experts, who were
happily enabled by the very scheme of the administration of justice
to deal with the practical problems of law on an objective, scientific
basis. This, it would seem, is the underlying explanation of the logical
precision that characterized the method and the product of the great
Roman jurists.
IV
It remains in conclusion to allude all too briefly to the reception of
Roman law as crystallized in the Corpus Juris in later Europe. After
Justinian, this system of law continued to develop in the Eastern Empire,
rapidly diminishing in vitality until it was submerged with the fall of
Constantinople to the Turks in the Fifteenth Century. The real resur-
rection of Roman law, however, occurred in the West. There it main-
tained a precarious, diluted, subordinate existence as the personal law
of the subject peoples in the chief former Roman provinces, until the
Eleventh Century, when the serious study of Roman law was revived
in the universities of northern Italy and thereafter in other parts of
Europe. As the pupils of the glossators and the long procession of their
academic successors, who taught them the law of Rome as the universal
law, were increasingly taken into official positions in the emerging national
governments, they inevitably brought to bear upon the duties of their
offices as administrators, judges, and advocates the conceptions of the
Roman jurists in which they had been schooled. By this means particu-
larly, the system created by the Roman jurisconsults was perpetuated,
centuries after the dissolution of the Empire, in the medieval and
modern civil law. This is undoubtedly the conclusive proof of its his-
torical and scientific significance.
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This is not to suggest that the so-called reception of the Roman law in
Western Europe during the Renaissance simply or completely revived
the principles embodied in the Corpus luris Civilis. Even in countries
where formal enactments recognized Justinian's codification as the
source of a subsidiary "common law," its assimilation was partial and
biased; the classical doctrines were inevitably construed, perverted, or
ignored in the light of current necessities and in varying measure amal-
gamated with indigenous institutions and conceptions. Moreover, in
this complex process, a number of factors, in addition to the refinement
of the Roman legal conceptions as compared with the local laws, were
operative in the reception; the fact that the law of Rome had been
systematized in a written codification carrying the prestige of the Empire
and consequently appeared to incorporate universal principles of justice,
was supported, in its claim to superiority over the cruder local customs,
by political considerations. Most important, doubtless, was the circum-
stance that Roman law was taught in the universities, where the future
leaders of the legal profession and of the bureaucracy were being
trained. As Maitland has observed, "Law schools make tough law."9
Even on the background of the remarkable interest in classical culture
that characterized the Renaissance, the reception of Roman law forms
a complex, panoramic problem in the history of European culture. In
the process, an extensive body of conceptions, both ancient and alien,
was absorbed in a number of countries under conditions sufficiently
diverse and over so long a period of time, as to form a unique case of
cultural imitation. However the event be explained, it is to be supposed
that, for the times and places in which the reception occurred, the legal
conceptions evolved by the Roman jurists possessed certain qualities
that made them superior to the available alternatives. The central fact
is the reception.
It should not be supposed that formal adoption of the Roman law
as a ius commune was indispensable to reception of the Roman ideas.
Even in the area of the Anglo-American common law, where the law
of Justinian has never been recognized as an authoritative source of
law (except in jurisdictions such as Scotland, Quebec, and Louisiana),
it is noteworthy that the Roman conceptions have had pervasive, if
unacknowledged, influence; indeed, there were two creative epochs in the
development of English law when the civil law was all but formally
received. The relationship between these, the two outstanding legal
systems in the western world, the Anglo-American common law and the
civil law derived from that of Rome, is a moot question, yet to be
9 ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE 25 (1901).
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comprehensively explored. Even so, it is clear that the basic ideas
respecting legal classification and terminology and the common legal
conceptions, particularly in the law governing ordinary human relations,
only less obviously in England and North America than in Continental
Europe, lead back to Rome. There has been, in other words, in the
common law itself a largely unconscious and silent utilization of the
legal notions prevalent in Western culture, which in a degree justifies
Chief Justice Tindall's encomium to the civil law as "the fruit of the
researches of the most learned men, the collective wisdom of ages and
the groundwork of the municipal law of most of the countries .in
Europe.' 0
In conclusion, it may be said that the significance of Roman law in
Western civilization, understood in a broad sense, implies first, the
development of a fundamental body of legal doctrine, which, with the
feudal law, the canon law, and the law merchant, has been a central
common element in the individual legal systems of much of Continental
Europe, and its colonies; second, the even wider dissemination of a
basic stock of systematic legal conceptions and principles not merely
in the civil law systems but also in the Anglo-American common law;
third, the further extension of this stock of conceptions by virtue of
its acceptance in the system of international law developed by Hugo
Grotius and his successors; and fourth, the even more important fact
that the language of Roman law has become a lingua franca of universal
jurisprudence, as evolved in the dusty tomes of medieval civilians and
canonists and their successors, the writers on natural law and legal
philosophy and the more modern pandectists, whose works are the chief
source of technical legal theory. The significance of Roman law in the
modem world is thus historical; it rests, as Sir Henry Maine reminded
us, in "the immensity of the ignorance to which we are condemned by
ignorance of Roman Law.""
10 Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 353 (1843).
11 Roman Law and Legal Education in VmLAGE Comu=Es n TB EAST AND WEST,
330 at 333 (7th ed. 1913).
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